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OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) appeals the United States Tax Court‟s ruling that the 
latter had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim by Sunoco, 
Inc., and its Subsidiaries (collectively referred to as 
“Sunoco”).   The underlying dispute arises from Sunoco‟s 
overpayment of income tax for certain years.  The IRS either 
refunded the overpayments to Sunoco or applied the 
overpayments as credits to other tax years and/or to other of 
Sunoco‟s liabilities for other types of taxes before Sunoco 
contested  a notice of deficiency the IRS issued for those 
years.  Sunoco claimed that the IRS did not pay it enough 
overpayment interest on those overpayments.  The Tax Court 
ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Sunoco‟s 
claim.   In its appeal, the IRS argues that the Tax Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over Sunoco‟s claim.  We agree 
and will therefore vacate the Tax Court‟s ruling. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Sunoco, Inc., formerly Sun Company, Inc., 
headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the parent of 
a group of companies engaged primarily in the manufacturing 
and marketing of petroleum products, logistics businesses, 
and cokemaking operations, in the United States and 
elsewhere. For many years, Sunoco has filed a consolidated 
Federal tax return that includes several hundred of its 
subsidiaries. 
  
 As is typical of most large public companies, Sunoco 
is continually audited by the IRS.  The audits generally result 
in various adjustments  to Sunoco‟s tax liabilities for a 
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particular year, as items are identified by the IRS and by 
Sunoco‟s in-house tax personnel.   Those adjustments are 
both “up” (meaning additional taxes are owed) and “down” 
(meaning that Sunoco overpaid a given tax for a given 
period).  Many of these adjustments are resolved 
administratively within the IRS, either at the audit level or the 
IRS appeals office level. 
  
 The audits and appeals typically take years to 
complete.  Any applicable period of limitation is usually 
extended by the parties‟ execution of IRS Form 872-A, 
entitled “Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax.”  
In return, Form 872-A extends the time in which the taxpayer 
may file a claim for credit or refund for a given tax year.   
  
 On July 1, 1997, after the completion of one such audit 
cycle and an IRS administrative appeals process, the IRS 
issued a notice of deficiency to Sunoco for the tax years 1979, 
1981, and 1983. The IRS claimed deficiencies of income tax 
in the amounts of $10,563,157.00, $5,163,449.00, and 
$35,916,359.00 respectively, for a total amount of 
$51,642.965.00. 
  
 Sunoco responded to the notice of deficiency by filing 
a timely petition in the Tax Court in which it contested the 
IRS‟s determination of deficiencies for 1979, 1981,  and 
1983.  It also asserted that it had made income tax 
overpayments for those years totaling $46,100,857.00.  
Sunoco sought a refund of the overpayment together with 
interest. 
 
Thereafter, in November of  1997, Sunoco amended its 
petition to add, inter alia, allegations relating to certain errors 
that Sunoco claimed the IRS had made in computing 
underpayment and overpayment interest.  Sunoco alleged that 
for each of the disputed years, the interest the IRS had 
charged on “underpayments” pursuant to I.R.C. § 6601 was 
too high, and the interest the IRS had paid to Sunoco on 
“overpayments” pursuant to I.R.C. § 6611 was too low.1 
                                              
1
 The Tax Court summarized the situation before it as 
follows:  
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 The Tax Court held a trial on the merits with respect to 
certain substantive issues not related to the amount of  interest  
owed.
2
  The Tax Court subsequently issued two opinions on 
the disputed substantive issues.
3
  
                                                                                                     
[Sunoco‟s] overpayment claims include overpayments 
consisting in part of interest [the IRS] computed on the 
interim underpayment balances reflected in [Sunoco‟s] 
account, so-called underpayment interest. [Sunoco] 
contends that the amounts of underpayment interest . . . 
computed are too high. [Sunoco‟s] overpayment claims also 
include overpayments consisting in part of interest computed 
on the interim overpayment balances reflected in [Sunoco‟s] 
account, so-called overpayment interest. [Sunoco] contends 
that the amounts of overpayment interest respondent 
computed are too low. 
 
Sunoco, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of the IRS, 122 T.C. 
88, 91 (2004). 
 
 As the IRS explained in the memorandum it filed in 
the Tax Court in support of its motion to dismiss Sunoco‟s 
amended petition: 
 
The Internal Revenue Code 
separately provides, in section 
6601 and 6611, for the payment 
of underpayment interest on 
amounts payable by taxpayers to 
the government that are not paid 
when due and for the payment of 
overpayment interest by the 
government when taxes that have 
been overpaid by the taxpayer are 
refunded or credited. 
 
 
2
  The Tax Court severed Sunoco‟s overpayment claims 
relating to the interest on overpayments from the trial. 
 
3
 Sunoco, Inc. v. Comm’r of the IRS, 118 T.C. 181 (2002); 
Sunoco, Inc. v. Comm’r of the IRS, T.C. Memo. 2004-29. 
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 In May of 1999, Sunoco and the IRS entered into 
various stipulations that disposed of most of the competing 
claims.  The remaining disputes included the claim that the 
amount of interest paid to Sunoco on its overpayment of 
various taxes was insufficient. That was the claim that 
Sunoco had added by amending the petition it had filed in the 
Tax Court in response to the notice of tax deficiency.
4
 
 
 In March of 2000, the IRS moved to dismiss Sunoco‟s 
amended petition to the extent that it asked the Tax Court to 
order the IRS to pay additional overpayment interest under 
I.R.C. § 6611, 26 U.S.C. § 6611. The IRS contended that 
Sunoco‟s “claims for overpayment interest for the taxable 
years 1979, 1981, and 1983” must be “dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction [because] the Tax Court does not have 
jurisdiction to determine the amount of interest due on 
overpayments allowed prior to the commencement of the 
case.”  Most of the overpayments underlying Sunoco‟s claims 
for interest were interim overpayments that the IRS  credited 
against a tax liability of Sunoco for a different tax year and/or 
a different tax, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6402(a), 26 U.S.C. § 
6402(a), before the notice of deficiency issued.
5
  The IRS had 
refunded the remaining overpayments to Sunoco before the 
notice of deficiency issued.  In its motion to dismiss, the IRS 
                                              
4
 The other two unresolved issues, the determination of 
interest expense for purposes of computing Sunoco‟s foreign 
tax credit limitation and the deductibility of certain expenses 
at a strip mine, were decided in favor of the IRS on March 15, 
2002 (in 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 111), and February 4, 2004 (in 
118 T.C. 111), respectively.  Those rulings are unrelated to 
this appeal. 
 
5
 26 U.S.C. § 6402, captioned “Authority to Make Credits or 
Refunds,” provides, in relevant part, as follows: “General 
Rule. – In the case of any overpayment, the Secretary, within 
the applicable period of limitations, may credit the amount of 
such overpayment, including any interest allowed thereon, 
against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on 
the part of the person who made the overpayment and shall, 
subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e), refund any balance to 
such person.”  26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) (emphasis added). 
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challenged the Tax Court‟s jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Sunoco‟s claim for interest on Sunoco‟s overpayment of 
taxes. The IRS contended that Sunoco‟s appropriate remedy 
for seeking overpayment interest with respect to the amounts 
that had previously been refunded or credited is a timely-filed 
suit in a federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims.
6
   
 
 The Tax Court denied the IRS‟s motion to dismiss in 
an opinion dated February 4, 2004.  It held that it had 
jurisdiction to determine interest with respect to 
overpayments where the overpayments and interest on 
overpayments had been refunded to the taxpayer or otherwise 
credited to the taxpayer‟s account before the case arrived in 
the Tax Court.  Sunoco, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of 
the IRS, 122 T.C. 88 (2004).  The court‟s decision was based 
on its interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(1) and (3) as well 
its earlier decision in Estate of Baumgardner v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 85 T.C. 445 (1985).   
 
 After the Tax Court denied a motion to reconsider, the 
IRS and Sunoco filed a second stipulation of settled issues 
limited to the interest calculation issue.  Sunoco and the IRS 
expressed their intention to “agree to the underlying facts and 
the computation of interest, if the [Tax] Court‟s determination 
as to jurisdiction is either not appealed or is sustained on 
appeal, while preserving for potential appeal the legal issue of 
the Court‟s jurisdiction over [Sunoco‟s] claim to additional 
overpayment interest.” 
 
 Concurrently with the second stipulation of settled 
issues, the parties filed a stipulation as to the underlying tax 
liabilities for each of the disputed years, showing an 
overpayment of $14,587,489 for 1979, a deficiency of 
$287,345 to be assessed and paid for 1981, and a deficiency 
of $24,138,971 to be assessed for 1983, of which $20,104,500 
remains to be paid.   The Tax Court entered a decision 
accordingly on February 12, 2009. 
 
                                              
6
 Sunoco did file protective suits in the Court of Federal 
Claims, but voluntarily dismissed them with prejudice in 
January of 2009.  Sunoco, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. United 
States, Fed. Cl. Nos. 99-909 & 00-478 (consolidated).   
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 The IRS then filed this appeal challenging the Tax 
Court‟s jurisdiction over Sunoco‟s claim to additional interest 
on Sunoco‟s tax overpayments. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 
7482(a)(1).  Our review of the Tax Court‟s construction of the 
Internal Revenue Code is plenary. Nat’l  Starch & Chem. 
Corp. v. Comm’r of the IRS, 918 F.2d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 
1990).   We therefore exercise de novo review over the Tax 
Court‟s determination of its subject matter jurisdiction. 
Stepnowski v. Comm’r of the IRS, 456 F.3d 320, 322 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
III. DISCUSSION. 
 As noted earlier, when Sunoco filed its amended 
petition for redetermination of deficiencies for 1979, 1981,  
and 1983, Sunoco claimed, inter alia, additional interest on 
overpayments that the IRS had previously refunded to Sunoco 
and/or credited to other of Sunoco‟s tax liabilities, before the 
notice of deficiency issued.  As we have also noted, the Tax 
Court determined that it could exercise jurisdiction over 
Sunoco‟s claim based on its reading of 26 U.S.C. § 
6512(b)(1) and (3), and its earlier holding in Estate of 
Baumgardner v. Comm’r of the IRS.  See 122 T.C. at 96-101.7 
  
  On appeal here, the IRS contends that the Tax Court 
erred as a matter of law in its reading of the controlling 
statutes and in relying on the analysis in Baumgardner. We 
agree, and we will address each of the IRS‟s main arguments 
                                              
7
 See 122 T.C. at 100-01 (“We believe that [the IRS‟s] view 
of what constitutes an overpayment for purposes of section 
6512(b) is too narrow and does not square with our opinion in 
Estate of Baumgardner v. Comm’r, supra.  Contrary to [the 
IRS‟s] position, we believe that, under certain circumstances, 
additional overpayment interest that is allowable under 
section 6611(a) with respect to an interim overpayment is 
similar to the underpayment involved in Estate of 
Baumgardner and can constitute an overpayment for purposes 
of section 6512(b).”   
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separately.
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1. THE TAX COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT 
HAD 
JURISDICTION OVER SUNOCO’S CLAIMS FOR 
ADDITIONAL OVERPAYMENT INTEREST, 
BECAUSE SUCH  
INTEREST IS NOT AN OVERPAYMENT OF 
TAX. 
 
 At the outset, it is important to understand the 
difference between the two types of interest claims that 
Sunoco asserted in its amended petition.  Sunoco‟s first claim 
was that it had paid too much “deficiency interest.”  
Deficiency interest is interest charged to a taxpayer pursuant 
to I.R.C. § 6601, on tax underpayments the taxpayer has 
made (or should have made) for a given period.
9
  The IRS, 
like banks or any other creditor, charges interest on money it 
is owed over time. Thus, when a taxpayer underpays taxes for 
a certain tax period, the IRS charges interest on the amount of 
the deficiency. Concomitantly, the IRS pays a taxpayer 
interest on any amount of taxes that a taxpayer pays that 
exceeds the actual tax liability for a given year.  This second 
type of interest is known as “overpayment interest,” and it 
underlies the jurisdictional dispute here.  
 
The issue before us arises from Sunoco‟s claim that its 
tax payments exceeded the amount of taxes it owed for the 
years in question.  Sunoco therefore asked the Tax Court to 
award it the amount of interest it was purportedly owed on the 
amount of its  overpayment of taxes (“overpayment interest”) 
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6611.
10
              
                                              
8
 Because we conclude that the statutes conferring jurisdiction 
on the Tax Court do not extend to interest on Sunoco‟s 
overpayments, we need not address all of the arguments the 
IRS makes on appeal. 
 
9
 Deficiency interest is “interest on the amount of tax which is 
said to be unpaid.”  Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. United States, 
454 F.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1972) 
 
10
 Making matters more complicated, Sunoco claims that the 
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   The IRS acknowledges that the Tax Court had 
jurisdiction over the first type of claim under the Tax Court‟s 
limited overpayment jurisdiction set forth in I.R.C. § 6512(b).  
However, the IRS contends that the Tax Court does not have 
jurisdiction over the second type of claim, i.e., Sunoco‟s 
claim that the government did not pay it enough interest on 
Sunoco‟s overpayments of tax.  The IRS notes that Sunoco 
made interim tax payments for 1979, 1981, and 1983, before 
the IRS determined that there were deficiencies for those 
years.   At various times before Sunoco commenced the Tax 
Court proceedings, the IRS refunded overpayments to Sunoco 
or applied the overpayments as credits to other tax years 
and/or Sunoco‟s tax liabilities for other types of taxes.   
 
 Section 6611(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
that “[i]nterest shall be allowed and paid upon any 
overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax at the 
overpayment rate established under section 6621.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6611(a).  The IRS contends that overpayment interest is not 
itself an overpayment of tax because the taxpayer has paid 
nothing to the IRS.  Rather, the taxpayer is owed money by 
the government.   
 
 Therefore, according to the IRS, a claim for 
overpayment interest is a general monetary claim against the 
United States, which (like all such claims) must be brought in 
the federal district courts or the Court of Federal Claims 
within the six-year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2401 (district court)
11
 and 2501 (Court of Federal Claims).
12
  
                                                                                                     
Government owes interest on insufficient refunds as well as 
inadequate tax credits that were either paid or credited against 
other tax liabilities, and that any overpayment interest that 
was paid to Sunoco or any tax credits were less than Sunoco 
was entitled to based on the size of its overpayments; and that 
the Government therefore owes additional interest on those 
tax overpayments or insufficient credits.  However, the 
distinction is not relevant to our analysis.  We will therefore 
simplify things and use the term “overpayment interest” to 
refer to all of Sunoco‟s claims for interest from the 
Government as asserted in the amended petition Sunoco filed 
in the Tax Court. 
11
 Section 2401 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Except 
10 
 
 Thus, the IRS contends that the Tax Court wrongly 
held that insufficient overpayment interest should be 
characterized as an “overpayment” subject to its jurisdiction, 
in the same way that overpaid deficiency interest is treated as 
an overpayment within its jurisdiction. The IRS submits that 
the Tax Court improperly expanded its jurisdiction over 
disputes involving deficiency interest by equating interest a 
taxpayer owes the Government that has accrued on a tax 
deficiency with interest the Government owes a taxpayer on 
the amount of tax payments that exceed the taxpayer‟s actual 
tax obligation. We agree. 
 
2. THE TAX COURT’S JURISDICTION TO 
DETERMINE OVERPAYMENTS AND 
OVERPAYMENT INTEREST 
IS NARROWLY CIRCUMSCRIBED BY 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.  
 
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction 
possessing only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred by 
Congress.  See I.R.C. § 7442 (“The Tax Court and its 
divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them 
by this title, by chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939, by title II and title III of the Revenue Act of 
1926 (44 Stat. 10-87), or by laws enacted subsequent to 
February 26, 1926.”).  See also  Estate of Smith v. Comm’r of 
the IRS, 638 F.2d 665, 669 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The Tax Court . . 
. is purely a creature of statute and has only the power given it 
by Congress.”).  
 
Congress changed the status of the Tax Court from an 
administrative forum to an Article I court in the Tax Reform 
                                                                                                     
as provided by chapter 71 of title 41, every civil action 
commenced against the United States shall be barred unless 
the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action 
first accrues.”  28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).    
 
12
 Section 2501 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Every 
claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has 
jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed 
within six years after such claim first accrues.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2501.   
11 
 
Act of 1969.  However, nothing in the text of that Act 
suggests that Congress intended to broaden the Tax Court‟s 
jurisdiction or otherwise “decrease[] the dissimilarities 
between the Tax Court and the district courts.” Cont’l 
Equities, Inc. v. Comm’r of the IRS, 551 F.2d 74, 84 (5th Cir. 
1977) (explaining that nothing in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
“indicate[s] that Congress intended to obliterate other 
dissimilarities that it did not explicitly address.”).   
Accordingly, “the conclusion that the 1969 Tax Reform Act 
did not grant the Tax Court equitable jurisdiction is 
inescapable.”  Id.  Indeed, the Tax Court itself has noted that 
its “basic jurisdiction . . . was not changed by the Tax Reform 
Act.”  Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v.  Comm’r of the IRS, 57 
T.C. 392, 396 (1971).  
 
 The Tax Court‟s principal basis for jurisdiction is 
I.R.C. § 6213(a), 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a).  That section of the 
Tax Code gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to redetermine a 
“deficiency” in income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes 
as to which the IRS has issued a notice of deficiency pursuant 
to I.R.C. § 6212(a), 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a), and the taxpayer has 
filed a timely petition for redetermination.  Pursuant to I.R.C. 
§ 6214(a), the Tax Court has such jurisdiction “even if the 
amount so redetermined is greater than the amount of the 
deficiency” as set forth in the notice of deficiency, and its 
jurisdiction extends to “any additional amount, or any 
addition to the tax,” asserted by the IRS at or before trial. 
 
 However, jurisdiction concerning overpayments (e.g., 
tax refunds) generally lies with the federal district courts and 
the Court of Federal Claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1);
13
 
                                              
13
 Which provides: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, of . . . [a]ny civil action against the United 
States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to 
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or 
any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority 
or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner 
wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue law.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  We do not think it irrelevant that 
Congress chose not to make the jurisdiction of the various 
district courts concurrent with that of the Tax Court in 
12 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);
14
 Baumgardner, 85 T.C. at 452.   
Nevertheless, Congress did confer “overpayment jurisdiction” 
on the Tax Court, “[u]nder limited circumstances.” 
Baumgardner, 85 T.C. at 452.   The first such circumstance 
arises under I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1), which provides, in relevant 
part, as follows:  
[I]f the Tax Court finds that there 
is no deficiency and further finds 
that the taxpayer has made an 
overpayment of income tax for 
the same taxable year . . . in 
respect of which the Secretary 
determined the deficiency, or 
finds that there is a deficiency but 
the taxpayer has made an 
overpayment of such tax, the Tax 
Court shall have jurisdiction to 
determine the amount of such 
overpayment, and such amount 
shall, when the decision of the 
Tax Court has become final, be 
credited or refunded to the 
taxpayer.
15
   
 
26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(1). See Baumgardner, 85 T.C. at 452 
(“The Tax Court‟s overpayment jurisdiction is limited to 
situations where a deficiency has been determined and the 
taxpayer petitions the Court for a taxable period.”).  When the 
Tax Court is given overpayment jurisdiction, its jurisdiction is 
                                                                                                     
allowing for such claims. 
 
14
 Which provides, in relevant part, as follows: “The United 
States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to 
render judgment upon any claim against the United States 
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress 
or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any 
express or implied contract with the United States, or for 
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases sounding in tort.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 
 
15
 This grant of jurisdiction in §6512(b)(1) is subject to the 
limitations periods prescribed by subsection (b)(3).   
13 
 
exclusive. I.R.C. § 6512(a)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 6512(a)(1) (where 
taxpayer has filed a petition in the Tax Court for a 
redetermination of a deficiency, “no credit or refund of 
income tax for the same taxable year . . . shall be allowed or 
made and no suit by the taxpayer  for the recovery of any part 
of the tax shall be instituted in any court except,” as is 
relevant here, “[a]s to overpayments determined by a decision 
of the Tax Court which has become final.”).   
 
 The second circumstance where the Tax Court 
acquires overpayment jurisdiction is set forth in I.R.C. § 
6512(b)(2), 26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(2).  However, that provision 
merely gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to enforce its 
decisions.  Thus, § 6512(b)(2) provides: “[i]f, after 120 days 
after a decision of the Tax Court has become final, the 
Secretary has failed to refund the overpayment determined by 
the Tax Court, together with the interest thereon . . . , then the 
Tax Court, upon motion by the taxpayer, shall have 
jurisdiction to order the refund of such overpayment and 
interest.”  26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(2).   
 
 Although the Internal Revenue Code does not define 
the term “overpayment,” the Supreme Court has “read the 
word „overpayment‟ in its usual sense, as meaning any 
payment in excess of that which is properly due.”  Jones v. 
Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531 (1957). See also United 
States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 609 n.6 (1990)  (“The 
commonsense interpretation is that a tax is overpaid when a 
taxpayer pays more than is owed, for whatever reason or no 
reason at all.”).    
 
 The Tax Court‟s jurisdiction over overpayments is 
very constrained with respect to credits under I.R.C. § 6402, 
26 U.S.C. § 6402.
16
  Section 6402(a) provides that “[i]n the 
case of any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable 
period of limitations, may credit the amount of such 
                                              
16
 As noted earlier, “[m]ost of the overpayments underlying 
Sunoco‟s  claims for overpayment interest were interim 
overpayments that the IRS  credited against a tax liability of 
Sunoco for a different tax year and/or a different tax, pursuant 
to I.R.C. § 6402(a), 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a), before the notice of 
deficiency was issued.”  
14 
 
overpayment, including any interest allowed thereon, against 
any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part 
of the person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to 
subsections (c), (d), and (e), refund any balance to such 
person.”  26 U.S.C. § 6402(a).   The IRS has broad discretion 
in determining whether to credit an overpayment for one tax 
liability toward a different liability of the taxpayer,  see, e.g., 
Estate of Bender v. Comm’r of the IRS, 827 F.2d 884, 887 (3d 
Cir. 1987), and the IRS‟s discretion cannot be challenged in 
the Tax Court.  I.R.C. § 6512(b)(4) provides that “[t]he Tax 
Court shall have no jurisdiction under this subsection to 
restrain or review any credit or refund made by the Secretary 
under section 6402.”  26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(4).   
 
 Except in limited circumstances, the Tax Court also 
lacks jurisdiction over issues relating to interest, whether on 
underpayments or overpayments.  See Comm’r of the IRS v. 
McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 5-6 (1987); Zfass v. Comm’r of the IRS, 
118 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing “several appellate 
court cases which recognize that the Tax Court does not have 
jurisdiction regarding interest determinations.”); Melin v. 
Comm’r of the IRS, 54 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The 
Tax Court . . . does not have jurisdiction over challenges to 
interest determinations in most  circumstances.”); Bax v. 
Comm’r of the IRS, 13 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1993); Med-
James, Inc. v. Comm’r of the IRS, 121 T.C. 147, 152 (2003); 
White v. Comm’r of the IRS, 95 T.C. 209, 213 (1990).   
 
The interest imposed on underpayments by I.R.C. § 
6601(a) is generally excluded from the definition of a 
“deficiency” which the Tax Court has jurisdiction over, see 
White, 95 T.C. at 213, but it is otherwise treated as a tax 
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6601(e)(1) (“Any reference in this title 
(except subchapter B of chapter 63, relating to deficiency 
procedures) to any tax imposed by this title shall be deemed 
also to refer to interest imposed by this section.”).   
 
 However, if the Tax Court properly obtains 
jurisdiction over a deficiency for a given year and then finds 
that the taxpayer has overpaid its taxes for that year, the Tax 
Court may determine an overpayment of interest paid on the 
deficiency, if the interest accrued and was paid before the 
overpayment arose.  Estate of Baumgardner, supra.   See 
15 
 
Smith v. Comm’r, 429 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In 
[Baumgardner], the Tax Court held that, at least when interest 
has been assessed [against] and paid [by the taxpayer], it has 
jurisdiction to determine an overpayment of interest as part of 
its jurisdiction to determine an overpayment of tax on which 
the interest was paid.”);  Heffley v. Comm’r of the IRS, 884 
F.2d 279, 287 (7th Cir. 1989) (in Baumgardner, “[t]he Tax 
Court held that when it had jurisdiction to determine the 
overpayment of the tax, it also had jurisdiction to determine 
the overpayment of interest that the taxpayer paid with the 
tax.”).  The Tax Court‟s jurisdiction in such cases is based on 
the delinquency owed by the taxpayer, but may then extend to 
any claim that the taxpayer was charged too much interest on 
the delinquency.  The  Tax Court‟s ability to determine if the 
Government charged too much interest is tangential to that 
grant of jurisdiction arising from the tax deficiency.  
However, nothing in the relevant statutes or cases allows us to 
infer that Congress also intended to give the Tax Court 
jurisdiction over a taxpayer‟s claim against the Government 
for interest owed to the taxpayer arising solely from the 
taxpayer‟s overpayment of taxes. Indeed, that result would be 
contrary to the concurrent grant of jurisdiction that Congress 
limited to the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts 
without mention of the Tax Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1491(a)(1);
17
  28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
18
 
 
 The IRS properly concedes that the Tax Court has 
jurisdiction to determine overpayments of deficiency interest 
paid by Sunoco pursuant to I.R.C. § 6601.   However, the 
dispute between Sunoco and the IRS concerns interest which 
Sunoco claims the government owes it (pursuant to I.R.C. § 
6611) on overpayments of tax that had already been refunded 
or credited before the notice of deficiency was issued.  
Sunoco claims that since it was charged too much interest on 
various tax obligations, the Tax Court could award it the 
amount of interest that the Government charged that was in 
excess of the amount which Sunoco actually owed on those 
tax obligations. However, claims for such overpayment 
                                              
17
 See n.14, supra. 
 
18
 See n.13, supra. 
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interest are not subject to the Internal Revenue Code‟s 
requirements (in I.R.C. §§ 6511 (“Limitations on credit or 
refund”) and 7422 (“Civil actions for refund”)) for claiming a 
tax refund or a refund of deficiency interest.  Moreover, we 
can find no provisions in the Internal Revenue Code which 
specifically address actions to recover such overpayment 
interest.  See Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. United States, 454 
F.2d 1379, 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Barnes v. United States, 137 
F. Supp. 716, 718 (Ct. Cl. 1956).    
 
However, it is clear that  such actions constitute claims 
against the United States, viz., I.R.C. § 6611, and such claims 
must be brought by filing a complaint in the appropriate 
district court or the Court of Federal Claims within six years 
of the accrual of the cause of action.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1346(a)(2)
19
 & 2401
20
 (district courts); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1491(a)(1)
21
 & 2501
22
 (Court of Federal Claims).  
  
  The Tax Court has been given jurisdiction over 
overpayment interest in two very  narrow circumstances, both  
involving a final decision of the that court.   The first, already 
noted, concerns the enforcement of a decision.   It is set forth 
in I.R.C. § 6512(b)(2) which provides that “[i]f, after 120 
days after a decision of the Tax Court has become final, the 
                                              
19
 Which provides, in relevant part, as follows: “The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the 
United States Court of Federal Claims, of . . . [a]ny other civil 
action or claim against the United States, not exceeding 
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or 
any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the 
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in 
cases not sounding in tort.”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).   
 
 
20
 See n.11, supra.  
 
21
 See n.14, supra. 
 
 
 
22
 See n.12, supra. 
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Secretary has failed to refund the overpayment determined by 
the Tax Court, together with the interest thereon . . . , then the 
Tax Court, upon motion by the taxpayer, shall have 
jurisdiction to order the refund of such overpayment and 
interest.”  26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(2) (emphasis added).   
 
 The second circumstance in which the Tax Court has 
jurisdiction over overpayment interest is found in I.R.C. § 
7481(c).  That section provides in relevant part as follows:  
[I]f, within 1 year after the date of 
the decision of the Tax Court 
becomes final . . . in a case to 
which [I.R.C. § 7481(c)] applies, 
the taxpayer files a motion in the 
Tax Court for a redetermination 
of the amount of interest involved, 
then the Tax Court may reopen 
the case solely to determine 
whether the taxpayer had made an 
overpayment of such interest or 
the Secretary has made an 
underpayment of such interest and 
the amount thereof. 
 
26 U.S.C. § 7481(c)(1).  See ASA Investerings P’ship v. 
Comm’r of the IRS, 118 T.C. 423, 425 n.3 (2002) (I.R.C. § 
7481(c) “specifically carves out an exception to the rule on 
the finality of our decisions; a prerequisite for invoking that 
exception is a final decision of this Court.”).  Thus, “[i]f the 
Tax Court determines . . . that the taxpayer has made an 
overpayment of interest or that the Secretary has made an 
underpayment of interest, then that determination shall be 
treated under section 6512(b)(1) as a determination of an 
overpayment of tax.”  26 U.S.C. § 7481(c)(3).   This 
provision merely requires that an amount determined by the 
Tax Court as owing to the taxpayer “be credited or refunded 
to the taxpayer” in accordance with I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1), and 
it brings that amount within the Tax Court‟s “jurisdiction to 
enforce” under I.R.C. § 6512(b)(2).   
 
 I.R.C. § 7481(c) is therefore quite limited in scope and 
only reaches situations where: (1) the Secretary has made an 
assessment that includes interest, (2) “the taxpayer has paid 
18 
 
the entire amount of the deficiency plus interest claimed by 
the Secretary,” and (3) “the Tax Court finds under section 
6512(b) that the taxpayer has made an overpayment.”  I.R.C. 
§ 7481(c)(2), 26 U.S.C. §7481 (c)(2).  See Bax, 13 F.3d at 57 
(“The language [of § 7481(c)] is plain and clear: the tax court 
may make a redetermination of interest in cases where the 
taxpayer prepays both the entire amount of the deficiency and 
the interest claimed by the government on the deficiency.”) 
(emphasis in original).  “Congress did not expressly grant 
blanket federal jurisdiction over interest issues [to the Tax 
Court] through section 7481(c).”  Melin, 54 F.3d at 434.  
 
 Accordingly, neither I.R.C. §§ 6512(b)(2) nor 7481(c) 
supplies a basis for the Tax Court‟s exercise of jurisdiction 
over Sunoco‟s claims for additional overpayment interest. 
Those sections only address post-judgment proceedings and 
the Tax Court‟s jurisdiction to redetermine interest arising 
from its decision.  
 
The overpayment interest at issue here is not 
attributable to any decision of the Tax Court.  Indeed, no 
decision had been entered when Sunoco raised its interest 
claims.  Rather, the interest at issue here arises from 
overpayments that were refunded or credited before this case 
began.   We can find no statutory authorization for the Tax 
Court to determine this kind of claim, and we are not 
convinced by Sunoco‟s attempts to identify one.  
  
 Sunoco contends that the language in I.R.C. § 
6512(b)(1), that the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction “to 
determine the amount of such overpayment,” should be 
stretched to include the amount of interest on an overpayment 
for the taxable year that is before the Tax Court.  Sunoco 
argues that the omission of “interest” does not mean that 
overpayment interest cannot be determined by the Tax Court.   
However, Sunoco offers no authority for its contention and 
we have found none.   This argument is merely an ipse dixit. 
 
 In any event, I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1) does not provide 
jurisdiction for claims of overpayment interest of the type 
asserted by Sunoco here.  That section provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
(b) Overpayment determined by 
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Tax Court. – 
 
(1) Jurisdiction to determine. -- 
[I]f the Tax Court finds that there 
is no deficiency and further finds 
that the taxpayer has made an 
overpayment of income tax for 
the same taxable year . . . in 
respect of which the Secretary 
determined the deficiency, or 
finds that there is a deficiency but 
the taxpayer has made an 
overpayment of such tax, the Tax 
Court shall have jurisdiction to 
determine the amount of such 
overpayment, and such amount 
shall, when the decision of the 
Tax Court has become final, be 
credited or refunded to the 
taxpayer. 
 
26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(1).   In Estate of Baumgardner v. 
Comm’r of the IRS, 85 T.C. 445 (1985), the Tax Court held 
that an “overpayment of income tax,” under § 6512(b)(1)  
also includes an overpayment of interest that the taxpayer 
paid on the tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 6601.    
 
 Here, the Tax Court relied on  Baumgardner in 
holding that “[t]o the extent that overpayment interest under 
section 6611 is not credited, we believe that it can be 
considered to have been overpaid by the taxpayer for 
purposes of section 6512(b).”  122 T.C. at 102.   However, as 
the IRS correctly notes, an overpayment of tax by the 
taxpayer is not equivalent to interest that the Government 
owes the taxpayer.  As the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has explained, “the term „overpayment‟ as used in the 
Internal Revenue Code, generally does not incorporate the 
interest earned on the amount by which the taxpayer has 
overpaid its taxes.”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 384 F.3d 
1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  In concluding the contrary, the 
Tax Court failed to understand that Sunoco‟s claims for 
additional interest under I.R.C. § 6611 simply cannot be 
viewed as an “overpayment” when that term is “read . . . in its 
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usual sense.”  Liberty Glass, 332 U.S. at 531.   
 
In Liberty Glass, the Supreme Court “read the word 
„overpayment‟ in its usual sense, as meaning any payment in 
excess of that which is properly due.”  Id.  That is not the 
same as Sunoco‟s claim against the Government for interest it 
claims the Government owes on Sunoco‟s excess tax 
payments.   The essence of Sunoco‟s claim is that it received 
less interest than it was due on certain refunds and credits.  
However, “the payment of more than is rightfully due is what 
characterizes an overpayment.”  Id.  Interest owed by the 
government to a taxpayer cannot be an overpayment of tax 
paid by the taxpayer to the government. 
 
 The Tax Court reasoned that when the Government 
does not pay the proper amount of interest it owes on a tax 
overpayment, the taxpayer “will have overpaid [its] liability 
by the amount of allowable interest that is not credited.”  122 
T.C. at 101.   By way of explanation, the Tax Court posed the 
following hypothetical: 
For example, assume that, 
pursuant to section 6402(a), the 
Commissioner credits an 
overpayment of $1,000 against a 
liability of the same taxpayer for a 
different taxable year, but fails to 
include interest of $20 computed 
under section 6611 that is 
allowable on the overpayment.  
Under these facts, the taxpayer 
would have used $1,020 to satisfy 
a liability of $1,000.  In effect, the 
taxpayer would have overpaid the 
liability against which the 
overpayment is credited by $20.   
 
122 T.C. at 101-02.   
 However, as the IRS correctly explains, the amount 
“used” by the taxpayer is irrelevant because there is no 
possible way that the Tax Court‟s hypothetical taxpayer can 
use the $20 that it does not have in order to satisfy a liability.  
The fact that the taxpayer may have a claim for $20 of 
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interest does not convert a $1,000 credit into a $1,020 credit. 
The credit is what it is. See Appellants‟ Br. at 39-40.   Thus, 
the Tax Court‟s hypothetical does not illustrate how Sunoco‟s 
claim for interest the Government may owe it can be morphed 
into an overpayment of taxes or interest on an underpayment 
of a tax obligation conferring  jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 
6512(b)(1). 
 
 Moreover, the Tax Court‟s reasoning is undermined by  
I.R.C. §§ 6512(b)(2) and 7481(c). As noted, those sections 
authorize the Tax Court to enforce its decisions by ordering a 
refund of an “overpayment and interest” if the Government 
fails to pay (I.R.C. § 6512(b)(2)), and by redetermining the 
amount of interest paid by the IRS if the taxpayer claims that 
it is too low (I.R.C. § 7481(c)).   The IRS points out that if 
overpayment interest determinations were included in the Tax 
Court‟s overpayment jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1), 
both §§ 6512(b)(2) and 7481(c) would be unnecessary 
because the Tax Court would already be authorized to 
determine the amount of interest due along with an 
overpayment.  See Smith v. Comm’r of the IRS, 123 T.C. 15, 
51 (2004) (“if Congress had intended our overpayment 
decisions under section 6512(b) were to include final interest 
determinations, there would be no need to include section 
7481(c)(2)(B)” (Goeke J., dissenting) (cited with approval on 
appeal to the Fifth Circuit in holding  that the Tax Court 
lacked jurisdiction to refund the full amount of an 
overpayment,  see 429 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2006)).   
 
 Perhaps because there is no statutory authority in the 
Internal Revenue Code giving the Tax Court jurisdiction over 
a taxpayer‟s claim that the Government did not pay it enough 
overpayment interest, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6611, Sunoco 
submits that the availability of I.R.C. § 7481(c) post-
judgment relief confirms the Tax Court‟s power to review 
overpayment interest determinations.   
 
 Section 7481(c), captioned “Jurisdiction over interest 
determinations,” provides: 
(1) In general. – Notwithstanding 
subsection (a), if within 1 year 
after the date of the decision of 
the Tax Court becomes final 
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under subsection (a) in a case 
to which this subsection 
applies, the taxpayer files a 
motion in the Tax Court for a 
redetermination of the amount 
of interest involved, then the 
Tax Court may reopen the 
case solely to determine 
whether the taxpayer has made 
an overpayment of such 
interest or the Secretary has 
made an underpayment of 
such interest and the amount 
thereof. 
 
(2) Cases to which this subsection 
applies. – This subsection 
shall apply where – 
 
(A)(i) an assessment has been 
made by the Secretary under 
section 6215 which includes 
interest imposed by this title, 
and 
 
(ii) the taxpayer has paid the 
entire amount of the 
deficiency plus interest 
claimed by the Secretary, and 
 
(B) the Tax Court finds under 
section 6512(b) that the 
taxpayer has made an 
overpayment 
 
26 U.S.C. § 7481(c)(1), (2).   Sunoco notes that Congress 
amended I.R.C. § 7481(c) in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1977 
and added § 7481(c)(2)(B). Sunoco claims that the 
amendment gives the Tax Court the authority to entertain its 
claims for overpayment interest claims. 
 
 However, section 7481(c) does not apply here because 
Sunoco‟s additional overpayment interest claims do not arise 
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from an overpayment that was determined in a final decision 
of the Tax Court.  Moreover, Sunoco wants additional 
overpayment interest on overpayments previously refunded or 
credited to it before its case even began, not interest on an 
overpayment determined by the Tax Court in this case.   
Section 7481(c) requires both a Tax Court decision and a 
post-decision motion for relief.   Neither requirement is met 
here.
 23
  
 
3. Estate of Baumgardner provides no support  
for the Tax Court’s holding. 
 
 As noted, the Tax Court based its decision that it had 
jurisdiction over Sunoco‟s overpayment claims partly on the 
holding in Estate of Baumgardner v. Comm’r of the IRS, 85 
T.C. 445 (1985).  In Baumgardner, the decedent‟s estate and 
the IRS settled the issues raised in a notice of deficiency after 
the estate‟s personal representative had petitioned the Tax 
Court to redetermine the deficiency.  The estate and the IRS 
agreed that the estate had overpaid  its estate tax and that it 
was entitled to interest.  
  
 The issue before the Tax Court was whether the term 
“overpayment” in § 6512(b) included amounts that were paid 
as interest, pursuant to an installment payment plan under 
I.R.C. § 6166A.  85 T. C. at 446. (The Tax Court framed the 
issue before it as “whether an overpayment of estate tax, 
within the meaning of section 6512(b), may include the 
overpayment of amounts originally paid as tax and interest by 
means of section 6166A installment payments[.]”).  The IRS 
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 Sunoco also relies on Fortugno v. Comm’r of the IRS, 353 
F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965). There, we affirmed the jurisdiction 
of the Tax Court to determine whether an overpayment 
existed, when the only consequence of that finding was an 
award of overpayment interest.  However, the issue in that 
case was whether an overpayment existed at all, a matter that 
is clearly within the jurisdictional grant of I.R.C. § 
6512(b)(1).  There is nothing in our opinion to suggest that 
the Tax Court could take the additional step of determining 
the type of additional overpayment interest claim asserted by 
Sunoco here.  
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contended that the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to determine 
issues concerning interest and that the personal representative 
had to institute a separate refund action in the district court or 
Claims Court (now Court of Federal Claims).
24
   
  The Tax Court there held that the term “overpayment” 
as used in § 6512(b) includes interest and, therefore, held that 
it had “jurisdiction to consider interest as part of an 
overpayment.”  85 T. C. at 458-59.  Significantly, however, 
the Tax Court in Baumgardner made it abundantly clear that 
it was referring to interest that had accrued on a tax 
delinquency that had been paid to the Government.  The Tax 
Court held: “Interest may be part of an overpayment if the 
interest accrued and was paid prior to the time the 
overpayment was claimed or arose.  This is the type of 
interest we are considering in this case.”  Id. at 452. 
(emphasis added) See also id. at 460 (“Our holding [is] that 
the term „overpayment‟ includes assessed and paid interest at 
the time of overpayment.”).    
  
 As we have explained, the ordinary meaning of 
“overpayment,” does not extend to Sunoco‟s claim here.  
Baumgardner concerned a greater amount of interest that was 
paid by the taxpayer on a tax deficiency than was actually 
due. The claim there thus involved a claim for deficiency 
interest.  As we have explained, Sunoco‟s claim is not about 
overpayment of  deficiency interest; Sunoco‟s claim is about 
interest to be “allowed and paid” to the taxpayer “upon any 
overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax.”  I.R.C. § 
6611.    
 
 Thus, rather than following the holding in 
Baumgardner, the Tax Court actually extended the reasoning 
in that case to a very different situation.  The error of the Tax 
Court‟s approach is clearly illustrated in Alexander Proudfoot 
Co. v. United States, 454 F.2d 1379 (Ct. Cl. 1972). There, the 
Court of Claims explained: 
 [t]he Code‟s design for [deficiency] 
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 The IRS acknowledged, however, that as things stood at 
that time, the action could be barred by the expiration of the 
statute of limitations on filing a claim for a refund.  85 T.C. at 
448, 452-53. 
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interest is to assimilate it to the tax 
itself, so that the taxpayer who pays 
both . . . can and should proceed to 
seek to recover both together through 
one proceeding.  For a long time, 
deficiency interest has been so closely 
braided to principal that it has been 
deemed an integral part of the tax. 
 
454 F.2d at 1382 (emphasis added).  However, “Congress has 
distinguished markedly between a refund of that kind paid by 
a taxpayer and statutory interest payable by the Government 
on an overpayment.”  Id. at 1385.  The Court further 
explained: 
[T]he Revenue Code deals quite 
differently with statutory interest 
payable by the Government on 
overpayments.  Regulated by §§ 
6611-12, that form of interest is 
paid by the United States, not as a 
refund of interest previously paid 
by the taxpayer on demand of the 
Service, but simply because the 
Government has had the use of 
money found to belong to the 
taxpayer.  Typical is interest on an 
overpayment. . . .  Unlike 
deficiency interest paid by the 
taxpayer, Congress did not 
provide that statutory interest to 
be paid by the United States is to 
be fully assimilated in treatment 
to the principal amount of a tax.  
Nor does the Code extend the 
refund claim mechanism of § 
6511 to such interest, or tie a 
special limitations period to the 
filing of such a claim.  The result 
is that the ordinary six-year 
limitations statute controls . . . and 
no claim need be filed within the 
26 
 
time limits of § 6511.
25
 
 
Id. at 1384 (citations omitted).   
 This distinction between deficiency interest and 
overpayment interest has been recognized as critical in other 
cases where the taxpayer has attempted to obtain additional 
overpayment interest, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 384 
F.3d 1307, 1312 (citing cases), and in those involving 
governmental attempts to recover excessive overpayment 
interest.   In Pacific Gas & Elec. v. United States, 417 F.3d 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit explained that a “tax deficiency, tax penalty, and 
deficiency interest . . . are all components of a taxpayer‟s 
liability.  Therefore, these components are taken into account 
in determining whether an overpayment exists. . . .  There is 
no suggestion, however, that statutory [overpayment] interest 
is a part of, or even related to, a taxpayer‟s tax liability.”  Id. 
at 1382-83 (citations omitted).   
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has reached 
the same conclusion.  In E.W. Scripps Co. v. United States, 
420 F.3d 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2005), that court noted that I.R.C. 
§ 6601(e)(1)  “specifically provides for the treatment of 
deficiency interest, in most contexts, as part of the underpaid 
tax,” while “§ 6611, which pertains to statutory interest on 
overpayment of tax, does not contain a similar provision, 
which arguably implies that interest on an overpayment of 
taxes should not be treated as part of the overpaid tax itself.” 
 
 Finally, in Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Gov’t of the 
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 Which provides: “Claim for credit or refund of an 
overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of 
which the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by 
the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed 
or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such 
periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the 
taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.  
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax 
imposed by this title which is required to be paid by means of 
a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the 
time the tax was paid.”  26 U.S.C. § 6511(a).   
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Virgin Islands, 173 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D.V.I. 2001), rev’d on 
other grounds, 300 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2002), the district court 
opined: 
This absence of similar language 
[in I.R.C. § 6611] makes perfect 
sense because overpayments can 
bear no tax liability, whereas 
additions, underpayments, and 
penalties, are taxes by definition.  
Since there is nothing taxable 
about overpayments, they impose 
no substantive tax liability and 
sections 6611 and 6621 of the 
federal income tax law are merely 
administrative provisions to aid 
the government in calculating the 
amount of interest it owes to the 
overpaying taxpayer. 
 
173 F. Supp.2d at 391.   
 Because overpayment interest, i.e., interest owed to the 
taxpayer by the government, is not “a part of, or even related 
to, a taxpayer‟s tax liability” and is not “assimilated in 
treatment to the principal amount of a tax,” the Tax Court 
here erred in holding that “under certain circumstances, 
additional overpayment interest under section 6611(a) with 
respect to an interim overpayment is similar to the 
underpayment interest involved in Estate of Baumgardner 
and can constitute an overpayment for purposes of section 
6512(b).”  122 T. C. at 101. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For all of the above reasons, we hold that the Tax 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised 
in Sunoco‟s Amended Petition, and we will therefore vacate 
the order of the Tax Court. 
 
